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impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent. In
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1 Introduction
Open source software (OSS) is a computer program whose source code - the instructions for the
program, written in a human readable format - is distributed free of charge and can be modi…ed,
extended, adapted, and incorporated into other programs with relatively few restrictions. OSS
is a rapidly expanding phenomenon: some OSS such as the Apache web server, dominate their
product categories. In the personal computer market, the OSS such as the operating system
Linux and the web browser Firefox gain rapid popularity. It is estimated that there are currently
29 million users of Linux worldwide and there were over 50 million downloads of Firefox.1
Apart from having millions of OSS users, there are also tens of thousands of participating
programmers who contribute to various OSS projects, and there is also a growing number of
…rms who sell services, support, and documentation for OSS. The majority of the programmers
who participate in OSS projects are unpaid volunteers. For example, Hars and Ou (2002) have
surveyed 81 individuals involved in open source projects and found that only 16% received
any direct monetary compensation for their contribution. This raises obvious questions about
the incentives and motivations of the participating programmers who do not receive direct
compensation for their e¤orts. There are three main, mostly complimentary, explanations for
the willingness of programmers to contribute to OSS projects. The …rst two involve intrinsic
motivations while the third involves extrinsic motivations.
The …rst explanation is that programmers simply like to be involved in open source
projects, either because they simply enjoy being creative, or due to a sense of obligation or
community related reasons. Indeed, a web-based survey conducted by Lakhani and Wolf (2003)
reveals that the responding programmers were mainly driven by enjoyment-based intrinsic mo-
tivations.
The second explanation involves another type of intrinsic motivation. According to this
explanation, system managers (e.g., users of Apache) who need improvements in software and
are willing to make these improvements on their own. They then share these improvements with
others in their community. A model along these lines is o¤ered by Johnson (2001), who views
1See http://counter.li.org/estimate.php for the estimate on Linux and www.mozilla.org/products/…refox for
the estimate on Firefox.
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participation in OSS projects as a private provision of a public good (see Bessen, 2004, for a
related model).
The third explanation, suggested by Lerner and Tirole (2002), is that programmers are
willing to contribute to OSS projects in order to signal their ability to future employers, venture
capitalists, or to peers and thereby boost their human capital or get ego grati…cation. Fershtman
and Gandal (2004) examine a large data set on programmers’ participation in OSS projects and
argue that their …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that programmers who contribute
to OSS projects are driven by extrinsic motivations such as their desire to enhance their social
status within the programmers’ community or by their desire to signal their ability to potential
employers. Hann et al (2004), examine a longitudinal data set of participant contributions made
and accepted into three Apache open source projects for the period 1998 to 2002. They …nd
that more contributions to the Apache open source projects do not result in wage increases for
contributors. On the other hand, successful participation in the form of a higher status in the
merit-based ranking within the Apache open source community is associated with a 13% - 27%
increase in wages, depending on the rank attained. These …ndings are robust to various model
speci…cations and remain true even after controlling for work and programming experience.
Hann et al argue that their results are consistent with the notion that a high rank within the
Apache Software Foundation is a credible signal of the productive capacity of a programmer.
Drawing on the “career concerns” literature (e.g., Holmström, 1999), Lerner and Tirole
(2002) conjecture that the signalling incentive will become stronger as (i) performance becomes
more visible to the relevant audience, (ii) e¤ort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii)
performance becomes more informative about talent. The purpose of this paper is to examine
these conjectures in the context of a formal model. The main …nding in the paper is that the
model always admit a no-e¤ort equilibrium in which …rms do not expect programmers to exert
e¤ort in order to contribute to OSS projects, and programmer in turn do not exert such e¤ort.
However, the model may also admit an even number of interior equilibria, half of which are
stable and the other half is unstable. The analysis shows that the three conjectures are correct
only if we start from a stable interior equilibrium but are incorrect if we start from an unstable
interior equilibrium.
There are two closely related papers that also argue that programmers participate in
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OSS projects in order signal their abilities to prospective employers. The two papers however
di¤er from the current paper both in terms of their set up and in terms of their main focus.
Lee, Moisa, and Weiss (2003) consider a model in which programmers need to choose between
joining closed source software …rms or OSS projects. If they join software …rms, their wage
re‡ects the expected productivity of all programmers who join software …rms (talented ones and
less talented ones). On the other hand, if they join OSS projects, they forgo current wages,
but can signal their productivity to software …rms and hence boost their future wages. The
main focus of their analysis is on the relative sizes of the closed source system and the open-
source system. In particular, their show that an open-source system will never exist alone in
the market because mediocre programmers, who cannot bene…t from signaling their talent, will
always prefer to joint closed source software …rms. On the other hand, a closed-source system
can exist alone in the market, especially if the population of talented programmers is relatively
small.
Leppämäki and Mustonen (2004) consider a model in which programmers signal their
talent to software …rms by choosing how many lines of code to contribute to an OSS project. As
in the traditional Spence signalling model, talented programmers have a lower cost of writing
lines of code. Consequently, in a separating equilibrium, only talented programmers contribute
to the open source project and their contribution is chosen so as to deter untalented programmers
from mimicking them. The model departs from the traditional Spence signalling model in
that the freely available OSS project imposes either a positive or a negative externality on the
commercial software o¤ered by …rms. The externality in turn a¤ects the wages that software
…rms are willing to o¤er agents and hence the marginal bene…t to signalling. Leppämäki and
Mustonen focus on the e¤ect of the externality on the incentive of talented agents to contribute
to the OSS project. In particular, they show that if the OSS is a substitute (complement) for
the commercial software then the contribution of talented programmers will end up being lower
(higher) than in the case where OSS and the commercial software are independent of each.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
shows that the model can give rise to multiple equilibria and characterizes them. Section 4 study
the comparative static properties of the model and in particular examines how the incentive
to contribute to OSS projects is a¤ected by the visibility of the contribution to prospective
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employers, by the sensitivity of performance to e¤ort, and by how informative is the performance
about talent. Finally, I examine the e¤ect of intrinsic motivation to contribute to OSS projects
in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a competitive job market with a large number of agents, each of whom is either
“talented” (i.e., has a high productivity) or “untalented” (i.e., has a low productivity). The
marginal productivity of each talented agent if he is hired is w, while the marginal productivity
of an untalented agent if he is hired is normalized to 0. Under full information, the wage of each
agent is equal to his marginal product. Hence, the wage of talented agents is w while the wage
of untalented agents is 0.
Under asymmetric information, it is common knowledge that the fraction of talented
agents in the population is ®, but …rms cannot tell the agents’ types apart before hiring them.
To signal their types, agents can engage in some activity before they are hired by …rms. Partic-
ipation in an OSS project provides a good opportunity for talented agents to signal their ability
due to the resulting exposure they get from peers. Speci…cally, I assume that when agents
participate in an OSS project, they can either succeed (i.e., “solve a problem”) or they can fail
(i.e., “fail to come up with satisfactory results”). In particular, if an agent is talented and exerts
e¤ort e in the OSS project, his probability of success is p(e; °), where ° is a shift parameter.
With probability 1 ¡ p(e; °) the agent fails. On the other hand, if the agent is untalented, his
action succeeds with probability p0 which is independent of his e¤ort level. Since untalented
agents cannot boost their probability of success, they do not exert any e¤ort.
In and of itself, the activity does not bene…t the …rms nor the agents directly (for now
I ignore the intrinsic motivation to participate in the OSS project). The only advantage of the
activity from the …rms and the agents’ perspective is that it generates a signal on the agents’
types. Firms cannot observe directly observe the e¤orts that the agents exert; rather they
can only (imperfectly) observe whether the agent’s activity has succeeded. In particular, …rms
observe a successful action with probability ¯. With probability 1¡¯, as well as when the activity
fails, …rms observe nothing. Hence, ¯ is a measure of the visibility of the agents’ performance
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to potential employers. Whenever …rms observe nothing, they cannot discern whether the agent
has participated in the OSS project and did not succeed or whether he did not participate at
all.
Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, I make the following assumptions on the
probability that a talented agent will succeed:
A1 pe(e; °) > 0 > pee(e; °)
A2 lime!1 pe(e; °) = 0
A3 p(0; °) = p0 ¸ 0; lime!1 p(e; °) = 1
A4 p°(e; °) > 0; pe°(e; °) > 0
Assumption A1 says that e¤ort raises the probability of success but does so at a decreasing
rate. Assumption A2 implies that at the limit as e increases, the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on
the probability of success goes to 0. This assumption will ensure the existence of a solution to
the maximization problem of agents. Assumption A3 says at one extreme, if talented agents do
not exert e¤ort, then their probability of success is equal to that of untalented agents, while on
the other extreme, if their e¤ort increases inde…nitely, their probability of success approaches 1
in the limit. Assumption A4 implies that the shift parameter ° raises both the probability and
the marginal probability that the activity will succeed. Hence, when ° increases, e¤ort has a
stronger impact on an agent’s performance.
The payo¤ of each agents is increasing with his wage and decreasing with his e¤ort level:
U = w ¡ e:
3 Equilibrium
I now look for a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which talented agents exert e¤ort, untalented
agents do not exert e¤ort, and the beliefs of …rms are consistent with the agents’ strategies. To
characterize this equilibrium, suppose that …rms believe that the e¤ort of talented agents is be.
Then, conditional on observing a successful action, …rms believe that the agent is talented with
6
probability
q(be; ° j s) = ®p(be; °)
®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0 : (1)
On the other hand, if …rms do not observe a success, they cannot tell whether (i) the agent is
talented, exerted e¤ort, and failed, or (ii) the agent is talented, exerted e¤ort and succeeded,
but his success was unobserved, (iii) the agent is untalented and failed, or (iv) the agent is
untalented, succeeded nonetheless, but his success was not observed. Hence, conditional on not
observing a successful action, …rms believe that the agent is talented with probability
q(be; ° j n) = ® ((1¡ p(be; °)) + (1¡ ¯)p(be; °))
® ((1¡ p(be; °)) + (1¡ ¯)p(be; °)) + (1¡ ®) ((1¡ p0) + (1¡ ¯)p0) (2)
=
®(1¡ ¯p(be; °))
1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0) :
Note that given Assumption A3, q(0; ° j s) = q(0; ° j n) = ®: if …rms expect talented agents
to exert no e¤ort, then success or failure is not an informative signal about the agent’s talent.
Moreover, note that q(be; ° j s) approaches 1 as p0 approaches 0: if untalented agents cannot
succeed then success is a sure sign that the agent is talented.
Next, we need to …nd the e¤ort level that talented agents will exert. To this end, note that
since the labor market is competitive, the wage of agents is q(be; ° j s)w following an observed
success and q(be; ° j n)w otherwise. Hence, the expected payo¤ of talented agents given their
e¤ort level, e, and given the belief of …rms, be, is
U(e) = ¯p(e; °)q(be; ° j s)w + ((1¡ ¯)p(e; °) + 1¡ p(e; °)) q(be; ° j n)w ¡ e: (3)
The …rst term on the left-hand side re‡ects the idea that with probability ¯p(e; °), the talented
agent’s action succeeds and his success is observed by …rms. The second term on the left-hand
side re‡ects the idea that with probability (1 ¡ ¯)p(e; °), the successful action of a talented
agent is not observed by …rms and with probability 1¡ p(e; °) it fails altogether. In both cases
…rms cannot tell whether the agent is talented or not and they pay him a wage q(be; ° j n)w.
The last term on the left-hand side of the equation is the agent’s cost of e¤ort.
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Assuming that there is a large number of talented agents, each will ignore the e¤ect of
his own e¤ort level on be. Since Assumption A1 ensures that U 00(e) < 0, the e¤ort level that each
talented agent will choose given the …rms’ beliefs, be, is de…ned implicitly by the following …rst
order condition:
U 0(e) = ¯pe(e; °)¢(be; °)w ¡ 1 · 0; eU 0(e) = 0; (4)
where
¢(be; °) ´ q(be; ° j s)¡ q(be; ° j n)
=
®p(be; °)
®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0 ¡ ®(1¡ ¯p(be; °))1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0) (5)
=
® (1¡ ®) (p(be; °)¡ p0)
(®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0) (1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0)) ;
is the increase in the probability that …rms assign to an agent being talented following an
observed success. The expression ¯pe(e; °)¢(be; °)w represents the marginal bene…t from e¤ort
which is equal to the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability that a successful action will
be observed, ¯pe(e; °), times the extra wage that an agents gets in this event, ¢(be; °)w. At an
interior optimum, this marginal bene…t must be equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort, which is 1.
But, if ¯pe(e; °)¢(be; °)w is smaller than 1 for all positive e¤ort levels, then the talented agent
will not exert any e¤ort.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that
¢be(be; °) = ® (1¡ ®) pe(be; °) £¯®2 (p(be; °)¡ p0)2 + p0(1¡ ¯p0)¤
(®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0)2 (1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0))2 > 0: (6)
That is, if …rms believe that talented agents exert more e¤ort, then observed success leads to a
larger increase in the probability that …rms assign to an agent being talented. Recalling that
¢(be; °)w is the extra expected wage that an agent receives following an observed success, this
implies that as …rms believe that talented agents exert more e¤ort, they are willing to pay
higher wages to agents who were observed to be successful. Moreover, since by Assumption A3,
q(0; ° j s) = q(0; ° j n) = ®, then ¢(0; °) = 0. Hence, if …rms believe that talented agents
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do not exert e¤ort, then observed success does not increase their assessment that the agent is
talented.
Let BR(be) denote the solution of (4). This function is the best-response of each talented
agent against the …rms’ beliefs about his e¤ort level. In equilibrium, the …rms’ beliefs must be
consistent with the true e¤orts of the talented agents. Hence, the equilibrium e¤ort level, e¤, is
de…ned implicitly by the equation
e¤ = BR(e¤): (7)
In other words, the equilibrium is de…ned by the intersection of the best response function,
BR(be), with the 45o line in the (e; be) space. Given its central role in what follows, I now study
the properties of BR(be) in the next lemma. To establish this lemma, I …rst make the following
assumption on the marginal productivity of a talented agent if he is hired by a …rm:
A5 The marginal productivity of a talented agent is such that
w > w ´ (®+ (1¡ ®)p0) (1¡ ¯ (®+ (1¡ ®)p0))
¯® (1¡ ®) (1¡ p0) p0 : (8)
Lemma 1: Suppose that Assumption A5 holds. Then, the best response of talented agents
against the …rms’ beliefs about their e¤ort levels, BR(be) has the following properties:
(i) Suppose that BR(be) = 0 for all 0 < e · be1 and BR(be) > 0 for all e > be1, where be1 is
implicitly de…ned by the equation ¯p0¢(be1; °)w = 1.
(ii) BR0(be) > 0 for all e > be1 and limbe!1BR0(be) = 0:
Proof: (i) First, note that since¢(0; °) = 0, U 0(e) = ¡1 when be = 0, so BR(0) = 0. Otherwise,
if be > 0, then ¢(be; °) > 0. Since pee(e; °) < 0, U 0(e) is a strictly decreasing function of e for allbe > 0. Assumption A2 implies that as e goes to in…nity, U 0(e) goes to ¡1. Hence, U 0(e) = 0
attains a unique interior solution if and only if
U 0(0) = ¯p0¢(be; °)w ¡ 1 > 0; (9)
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where the equality follows because by Assumption A3, p(0; °) = p0.
Since ¢(0; °) = 0, condition (9) clearly fails when be = 0, and by continuity, it also fails
for su¢ciently small values of be. On the other hand, since ¢be(be; °) > 0, an increase in be raises
U 0(0). Recalling from Assumption A3 that lime!1 p(e; °) = 1, it follows that in the limit, as be
increases,
limbe!1¢(be; °) = ® (1¡ ®) (1¡ p0)(®+ (1¡ ®)p0) (1¡ ¯ (®+ (1¡ ®)p0)) :
This implies in turn that (9) can be satis…ed for a large enough be if and only if
limbe!1U 0(0) =
¯® (1¡ ®) (1¡ p0) p0w
(®+ (1¡ ®)p0) (1¡ ¯ (®+ (1¡ ®)p0)) ¡ 1 > 0: (10)
A su¢cient condition for limbe!1U 0(0) > 0 is that w > w, where w is de…ned by (8).
Therefore, whenever w > w, there exists a unique value of be, denoted be1, such that
U 0(0) > 0 for all be > be1 and U 0(0) < 0 otherwise, where be1 is implicitly de…ned by the equation
U 0(0) = ¯p0¢(be; °)w ¡ 1 = 0.
This implies in turn that for all be · be1, U 0(e) < 1 for all e so BR(be) = 0. On the
other hand, for all be > be1, U 0(e) > 0 for su¢ciently small values of e. Since U 0(e) is a strictly
decreasing function of e and since U 0(e) goes to ¡1 as e goes to in…nity, it follows that wheneverbe > be1, there exists a unique value of e that solves the equation U 0(e) = 0. Hence, BR(be) > 0
for all be > be1.
(ii) As part (i) shows, BR(be) > 0 for all be > be1 and it is de…ned implicitly by the equation
U 0(e) = 0: That is, U 0(BR(be)) = 0. Fully di¤erentiating this equation with respect to be and
rearranging terms, yields
BR0(be) = ¡pe(e; °)¢be(be; °)
pee(e; °)¢(be; °) > 0; (11)
where the inequality follows because pee(e; °) < 0 and because ¢be(be; °) > 0. To complete the
proof, note that as be increases so does e: However, Assumption A2 shows that lime!1 pe(e; °) =
0. Hence, BR0(be) goes to 0 as be goes to in…nity. ¥
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Using Lemma 1, I can now characterize the equilibrium e¤ort level of talented agents. To
this end, recall from (7) that the equilibrium condition is given by e¤ = BR(e¤). Since BR(be)
passes through the origin, e¤ = 0 is a solution to the equilibrium condition. Hence, there always
exists a no-e¤ort equilibrium in which talented agents are not expected to exert e¤ort and in fact
do not exert e¤ort. The question is whether there are additional solutions to the equilibrium
condition e¤ = BR(e¤)?
To address this question, I present BR(be) in Figure 1, using Lemma 1. The …gure
shows BR(be) in the (e; be) space. As the …gure shows, BR(be) coincides with the vertical axis for
su¢ciently small values of be. As be increases above be1, BR(be) increases with be. Since BR0(be) goes
to 0 as be goes to in…nity, BR(be) eventually becomes very steep.2 Figure 1 also shows the 450
line. The equilibrium e¤ort level of talented agents is determined by the intersection of BR(be)
with the 450 line. As the …gure shows, there are in general two possibilities depending on the
shape of BR(be).
The …rst possibility, illustrated in Figure 1a, arises when BR(be) intersects the 450 line
only at e = 0. In this case, the model does not admit interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0. A
su¢cient (though not necessary) condition for case (i) is that BR0(be) < 1 for all be > be1. The
second possibility, illustrated in Figure 1b, arises when BR(be) intersects the 450 line at least
once from above at some be > be1. In this case, we do have interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0.
But, since BR0(be) goes to 0 as be goes to in…nity, BR(be) must intersect the 450 line at least one
more time but from below. Hence, if there are interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0, then their
number must be even. A necessary condition for the model to admit only two interior equilibria
(apart from the no-e¤ort equilibrium) is that BR00(be) < 0. Using (11), it follows that this is the
case whenever
BR00(be) = ¡ pe(e; °)
pee(e; °)
d
dbe
·
¢be(be; °)
¢(be; °)
¸
:
Since pee(e; °) < 0, it follows that BR00(be) < 0 if and only if ddbe h¢be(be;°)¢(be;°) i < 0.
I summarize this discussion in the following Proposition:
2Note that since Figure 1 shows BR(be) in the (e;be) space, a steep curve is associated with small value of
RB0(be).
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Figure 1a: No interior equilibria
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Figure 1b: Four interior equilibria
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Proposition 1: A su¢cient condition for the no-e¤ort equilibrium to be unique is that BR0(be) <
1 for all be > be1. If however the model admits interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0, then their
number must be even.
Next, suppose that there exist interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0. Recalling that in
equilibrium the …rms’ beliefs must be consistent with the true e¤orts of the talented agents,
i.e., be = e¤, and substituting this equality into equation (4), the equilibrium e¤ort level, e¤, is
implicitly de…ned by
¯G(e¤; °)w = 1; G(e¤; °) ´ pe(e¤; °)¢(e¤; °): (12)
It should be noted that the left-hand side of equation (12) di¤ers from the left-hand side of
equation (4) because in the latter, the beliefs of …rms about the e¤orts of talented agents are
arbitrary, while in the former they are consistent with the true e¤orts of talented agents. Hence,
¯G(e¤; °)w can be interpreted as the marginal bene…t of e¤ort from an agents’ point of view in
equilibrium (i.e., given that …rms hold correct beliefs about the agent’s e¤ort).
In the next section, I will study the comparative statics properties of e¤. Since the
function G(e¤; °) plays a key role in that analysis, I now establish an important property of
G(e¤; °).
Lemma 2: Ge(e¤; °) ¸ (<)0 as ¡pee(e¤;°)pe(e¤;°) · (>) ®w(1¡®)
³
1 + p0(1¡¯p0)
(p(e¤;°)¡p0)2
´
:
Proof: Straightforward di¤erentiation reveals that
Ge(e
¤; °) = pee(e¤; °)¢(e¤; °) + pe(e¤; °)¢e(e¤; °) (13)
=
·
pee(e
¤; °)
pe(e¤; °)
+
¢e(e
¤; °)
¢(e¤; °)
¸
G(e¤; °):
But, using equations (5), (6), and (12), yields
¢e(e
¤; °)
¢(e¤; °)
=
pe(e
¤; °)
£
¯®2 (p(e¤; °)¡ p0)2 + p0(1¡ ¯p0)
¤
(®p(e¤; °) + (1¡ ®)p0) (1¡ ¯ (®p(e¤; °) + (1¡ ®)p0)) (p(e¤; °)¡ p0) (14)
=
®
(1¡ ®)w
µ
1 +
p0 (1¡ ¯p0)
(p(e¤; °)¡ p0)2
¶
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Substituting from (14) into (13),
Ge(e
¤; °) =
·
pee(e
¤; °)
pe(e¤; °)
+
®
w (1¡ ®)
µ
1 +
p0 (1¡ ¯p0)
(p(e¤; °)¡ p0)2
¶¸
G(e¤; °): (15)
The result follows by noting that the sign ofGe(e¤; °) depends on the sign of the square bracketed
expression. This expression can be either negative or positive since pee(e
¤;°)
pe(e¤;°) is negative by
Assumption A1, while ®
w(1¡®)
³
1 + p0(1¡¯p0)
(p(e¤;°)¡p0)2
´
is positive. ¥
Lemma 2 shows that G(e¤; °) may either increase or decrease with e. Intuitively, holding
the belief of …rms, be, constant, the marginal bene…t of e¤ort from an agent’s point of view is
decreasing with e¤ort because e¤ort raises the likelihood of success at a decreasing rate. Hence
at …rst glance it would seem that G(e¤; °) should be decreasing with e. However, when talented
agents exert more e¤ort (and this is anticipated by …rms), their extra wage following a success
increases. This e¤ect raises the marginal bene…t of e¤ort, which in turn implies that G(e¤; °)
should be increasing with e. The …rst, negative, e¤ect is more likely to dominate the second,
positive, e¤ect when ® is small (there are few talented agents in the population) and when w is
large (the productivity of talented agents is large); in both cases, the wage gap between success
and failure is particularly large. Hence, Ge(e¤; °) is likely to be negative when ® is small and
when w is large and positive when ® is large and w is small.
At a more technical level, note from (13) and (11) that
Ge(e
¤; °) =
·
1 +
pe(e
¤; °)¢e(e¤; °)
pee(e¤; °)¢(e¤; °)
¸
pee(e
¤; °)¢(e¤; °)
= [1¡BR0(e¤)] pee(e¤; °)¢(e¤; °):
Since pee(e¤; °)¢(e¤; °), it follows that Ge(e¤; °) ¸ 0 if BR0(e¤) > 1 and Ge(e¤; °) < 0 if
BR0(e¤) < 1. To interpret these conditions, note that BR0(e¤) is just the slope of the best
response function of talented agents against the beliefs of …rms evaluated at the equilibrium
e¤ort level. When BR0(e¤) > 1, the best response at the equilibrium point, BR(e¤), is steeper
than the 450 line and hence cuts it from below. On the other hand, when BR0(e¤) < 1, BR(e¤),
is ‡atter than the 450 line and hence cuts it from above.
Notice that when BR(e¤) cuts the 450 line from below (e.g., the equilibria e¤2 and e
¤
4 in
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Figure 1b), the resulting equilibrium is stable in the sense that a Cournot tatônnement process
will lead to a convergence to the equilibrium point starting from any close neighborhood of the
equilibrium point. On the other hand, when BR(e¤) cuts the 450 line from above (e.g., the
equilibria e¤1 and e
¤
3 in Figure 1b), the resulting equilibrium is unstable. Hence,
Proposition 2: Suppose that the model admits interior equilibria in which e¤ > 0. Then, a
given interior equilibrium is stable if Ge(e¤; °) < 0 and unstable if Ge(e¤; °) ¸ 0.
Since Lemma 2 indicates that Ge(e¤; °) < 0 is more likely when ® is small and w is large
while Ge(e¤; °) ¸ 0 is more likely when ® is large and w is small, one can conclude that stable
equilibria are more likely when ® is small and w is large while unstable equilibria are more likely
when the reverse is true.
4 Comparative statics
Given Lemma 2, I now examine the conjectures of Lerner and Tirole (2002) that the signalling
incentive of agents is stronger:
(i) the more visible the performance to the relevant audience,
(ii) the higher the impact of e¤ort on performance, and
(iii) the more informative the performance about talent.
4.1 The e¤ect of the visibility of performance on e¤ort
To examine conjecture (i), recall that ¯ is a measure of the visibility of the agents’ performance
to …rms. Hence, I examine conjecture (i) by looking at the e¤ect of an increase in ¯ on e¤:
Proposition 3: An increase in ¯ which measures the visibility of the agents’ performance to
…rms, increases the e¤ort level that talented agents exert in stable interior equilibria but lowers
it in unstable interior equilibria.
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Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to e¤ and ¯ and rearranging terms,
@e¤
@¯
= ¡G(e
¤; °) + ¯ @G(e
¤;°)
@¯
¯Ge(e¤; °)
;
where
@G(e¤; °)
@¯
= pe(e
¤; °)
@¢(e¤; °)
@¯
= pe(e
¤; °)
® (1¡ ®) (p(be; °)¡ p0)
(®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0) ®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0(1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0))2
= pe(e
¤; °)¢(e¤; °)
®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0
(1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0)) > 0:
The sign of @e
¤
@¯
is equal to the sign of ¡Ge(e¤; °) which by Proposition 2 is positive in stable
interior equilibria and negative in unstable interior equilibria. ¥
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2. The equilibrium e¤ort level, e¤, is attained at the
point where ¯G(e¤; °)w, which is the equilibrium marginal bene…t of e¤ort, cuts the horizontal
line whose height is 1 and which represents the marginal cost of e¤ort. An increase in ¯ shifts the
equilibrium marginal bene…t of e¤ort upward. Whether this leads to an increase or a decrease
in e¤ depends on whether G(e¤; °) is upward or downward sloping. When G(e¤; °) is downward
sloping, which as Lemma 2 shows is likely to occur when ® is small and w is large, an increase
in ¯ leads to an increase in e¤. On the other hand, when ® is large and w is small, G(e; °) is
likely to upward sloping so an increase in ¯ lead to a decrease in e¤.
Proposition 3 shows that Lerner and Tirole’s (2002) conjecture that the signalling incen-
tive of agents will become stronger as their performance becomes more visible to the relevant
audience is true only if the model admits interior equilibria and then only in interior equilibria
that are stable. This a likely to be the case when there are few talented agents around (® is
small) and when talented agents earn a high wage (w is high). Otherwise, this conjecture is
incorrect: the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as the agents’ e¤ort becomes
less visible.
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e* e
Figure 2a: a is small and w is large - G(e*,g) is 
downward sloping
e* e
bG(e*,g)w
bG(e*,g)w
1
1
Figure 2b: a is large and w is small - G(e*,g) is 
upward sloping
4.2 The e¤ect of the sensitivity of performance to e¤ort on e¤ort
Next, I examine conjecture (ii) that the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as
e¤ort has a stronger impact on performance. Recalling that e¤ort has a larger impact on the
probability of success when ° increases, it is obvious that in order to examine this conjecture I
need to study the e¤ect of an increase in ° on e¤:
Proposition 4 : An increase in ° which ensures that e¤ort has a larger impact on the probability
that the action will succeed increases the e¤ort level that talented agents exert in the activity in
stable interior equilibria and decreases it in unstable interior equilibria.
.
Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to e¤ and ° and rearranging terms,
@e¤
@°
=
G°(e
¤; °)
¡Ge(e¤; °) =
pe°(e
¤; °)¢(e¤; °) + pe(e¤; °)¢°(e¤; °)
¡Ge(e¤; °) ;
where pe°(e¤; °) > 0 by Assumption A3, and
¢°(e
¤; °) =
® (1¡ ®) p°(be; °) £¯®2 (p(be; °)¡ p0)2 + p0(1¡ ¯p0)¤
(®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0)2 (1¡ ¯ (®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0))2 > 0:
Hence, the sign of @e
¤
@°
is equal to the sign of ¡Ge(e¤; °) which is positive in stable interior
equilibria and negative in unstable interior equilibria. ¥
As in the case of an increase in ¯, an increase in ° shifts G(e; °) upward. Hence, an
increase in ° will also lead to more e¤ort by talented agents if G(e; °) is decreasing with e and
to less e¤ort if G(e; °) is increasing with e. Again, Lemma 2 shows that G(e; °) is decreasing
with e if ® is small and w is large, but increasing with e if ® is large and w is small. Hence,
Lerner and Tirole’s (2002) conjecture that the signalling incentive will become stronger as e¤ort
has a stronger impact on performance is true only when initially, there are few talented agents
around (® is small) and when talented agents earn a high wage (w is high). Otherwise, this
conjecture is incorrect: the signalling incentive of agents will become stronger as the agents’
e¤ort has a weaker impact on their performance.
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4.3 The e¤ect of the informativeness of performance about talent on
e¤ort
Conjecture (iii) of Lerner and Tirole states that the signalling incentive of agents will become
stronger as performance becomes more informative about talent. This conjecture can be ex-
amined by studying the e¤ect of a change in the parameter p0 on the equilibrium e¤ort level
of talented agents, e¤. This is because a decrease in p0 implies that a successful agent is more
likely to be talented; that is, when p0 decreases towards 0, q(be; ° j s), which is the probability
that a successful agent is talented, increases towards 1.
Proposition 5 : Suppose that ¢p0(e¤; °) > 0. Then a decrease in p0 which ensures that
performance is more informative about talent, increases the e¤ort level that talented agents
exert in the activity in stable interior equilibria but decreases it in unstable interior equilibria.
If ¢p0(e
¤; °) < 0 then the reverse is true.
Proof: Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to e¤ and ° and rearranging terms,
@e¤
@p0
=
Gp0(e
¤; °)
¡Ge(e¤; °) =
pe(e
¤; °)¢p0(e
¤; °)
¡Ge(e¤; °) ;
where using the notation x ´ ®p(be; °) + (1¡ ®)p0,
¢p0(e
¤; °) =
dq(be; ° j s)
dp0
¡ dq(be; ° j n)
dp0
< 0;
where the inequality follows because (1) implies that dq(be;°js)
dp0
< 0 while (2) implies that dq(be;°jn)
dp0
>
0. Hence, the sign of @e
¤
@p0
is equal to the sign of Ge(e¤; °), which by Proposition 2 is negative
in stable interior equilibria and positive in unstable interior equilibria. Hence, a decrease in p0
raises e¤ in stable interior equilibria and lowers e¤ in unstable interior equilibria. ¥
Like Propositions 3 and 4, a decrease in p0 shifts G(e; °) upward. When G(e; °) is
decreasing with e, which is the case in stable interior equilibria, this shifts induces more e¤ort.
On the other hand, in unstable interior equilibria, G(e; °) is increasing with e so the decrease
in p0 induces less e¤ort. As before, whether the equilibrium is stable or not depends, among
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other things, on whether ® is small and w is large or conversely. In any event, once again the
conjecture is true only in stable interior equilibria but not true otherwise.
5 Intrinsic motivation for participation in OSS projects
Up to now I only considered extrinsic motivation for participation in OSS projects. Talented
agents took place in these projects in order to try and generate positive signals about their
talent and hence boost their prospects in the labor market. However, this view is obviously
too narrow given that many participants contribute to OSS projects for other reasons like their
sense of creativity, or the desire to solve problems that they face in performing daily tasks (like
system managers). The question is how such intrinsic motivations are going to e¤ect matters.
To address this issue, suppose that apart from their ability to boost their prospects in
the labor market, agents also draw a positive utility v from successful contributions to OSS
projects. Given v, the utility of talented agents becomes
U(e) = p(e; °) [v + ¯q(be; ° j s)w] + ((1¡ ¯)p(e; °) + 1¡ p(e; °)) q(be; ° j n)w ¡ e:
The e¤ort level that each talented agent will choose given the …rms’ beliefs, be, is now de…ned
implicitly by the following …rst order condition:
U 0(e) = pe(e; °) [v + ¯¢(be; °)w]¡ 1 · 0; eU 0(e) = 0:
As one can see, v raises the marginal bene…t from e¤ort and hence, other things being equal, it
expands the set of parameters for which the model attains an interior equilibrium. Moreover, v
shifts the best response function of talented agents outward in the sense that holding the belief
of …rms, be, constant, an increase in v leads to an increase in BR(be): Consequently, it is clear that
an increase in v will lead to more e¤ort in stable interior equilibria but less e¤ort in unstable
equilibria.
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